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The life of Mary Wollstonecroft and the principles of conduct put
forward in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman
By Dr. Stephen Carruthers 1

1. Introduction
‘I have certain principles of action: I know what I look for to found m y
happiness on.’ (1989:401). These words, written b y Mary Wollstonecraft
in Paris on 9 t h February 1795 to her lover Gilbert Imlay, at a time when
she had been effectivel y abandoned and left to bring up her infant
daughter alone, reveal a character that even in times of intense personal
distress and dependency was determined to follow the principles of
conduct she had established as conducive to her happiness. While
elements of these principles can be gleaned from her earlier works Thoughts on the Education of Daughters, published in 1787, Mary, A
Fiction and Original Stories, both published in 1788, and A Vindication of
the Rights of Man published in 1790 - it is in A Vindication of the Rights
of Woman, which was dedicated to the French statesman Talleyrand who
had published in 1791 a report advocating public education for both sexes,
that Wollstonecraft first clearl y set out these principles of conduct and
guidance on how they could be respected.

Mary Wollstonecraft wrote A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (A
Vindication), over the period 1790 to 1792 and, following on the success
of A Vindication of the Rights of Man written in repl y to Edmund Burke’s
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), the work established her
literary reputation both in England and France. A Vindication draws
1

Lec t ur er i n t h e Sc ho o l o f So c ia l S ci e nce s a nd La w, D ub l i n I n st it u te o f T ech no lo g y.
Co m me n t s o n t hi s p ap er ar e gr a te f u ll y r ec ei ved and ca n b e se nt to t he a ut h o r a t:
st ep he n.c ar r ut h er s @d i t.i e.

heavil y on Wollstonecraft’s background and experiences: first as a dutiful
but physicall y abused oldest daughter from a financially insecure
background with a violent father and submissive mother, and then as a
single woman struggling to establish her independence and support her
parents and siblings within the limited career opportunities available to
women. A Vindication was written at a critical junction in her life where,
following her earlier experiences as a teacher and governess, she had
become acquainted with leading dissenters and radicals centered around
Dr. Price, whose sermon extolling the virtues of the French Revolution
was the target of Burke’s Reflections, her publisher Joseph Johnson, with
whom she was collaborating on the Analytical Review, and the Swiss
painter Henry Fuseli with whom she was entangled in an unrequited love
affair.

In A Vindication, Wollstonecraft seeks to establish a moral framework
within which the justification for the rights of woman asserted in the book
can be defended. This moral framework, which is seen as an ‘emanation of
divinit y’ (1995: 127), is composed from a number of key conceptual ideas
which provide the principles of conduct which should be followed by both
men and women to enable the rights of woman to be vindicated: ‘If
women are b y nature inferior to men, their virtues must be the same in
qualit y, if not in degree, or virtue is a relative idea; consequentl y, their
conduct should be founded on the same principles, and have the same aim’
(1995:94-95). Wollstonecraft did not set out to demonstrate equalit y
between the sexes, but she did seek to establish a shared moral universe
which would provide women with the opportunit y to demonstrate their
true capacities and character. For Wollstonecraft the key requirements for
creating this shared universe were self-evident: ‘In what does man's preeminence over the brute creation consist? The answer is as clear as that a
half is less than the whole; in Reason. What acquirement exalts one being
above another? Virtue; we spontaneously repl y. For what purposes were
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the passions implanted? That man b y struggling with them might attain a
degree

of

knowledge

denied

to

the

brutes;

whispers

experience’

(1995:79). Wollstonecraft’s anal ysis in A Vindication of the role of
reason, virtue, and knowledge in establishing principles of conduct will
now be examined and the extent to which her own conduct can be
reconciled with the precepts she advocated.

2. Reason
For Wollstonecraft, reason is derived from God and the distinguishing
mark of humanit y: ‘Reason is, consequentiall y, the simple power of
improvement; or, more properl y speaking, of discerning truth. Every
individual is in this respect a world in itself. More or less may be
conspicuous in one being than another; but the nature of reason must be
the same in all, if it be an emanation of divinit y, the tie that connects the
creature with the Creator; for can that soul be stamped with the heavenl y
image, that is not perfected by the exercise of its own reason? (1995:
127). This belief in the progressive and beneficial effect of reason
followed in the mainstream of enlightenment thinking but was sharpl y at
odds with Rousseau’s pessimistic assessment of reason’s heightened role
in human life (Hampsher-Monk 1992:154). However, for Wollstonecraft
reason not onl y established women on an equal status with men but also
was the guiding force which could

enable women to

escape the

debilitating dependency on their emotions that was cynically encouraged
b y men to maintain women's subservient status: ‘Let the honest heart
shew itself, and reason teach passion to submit to necessity; or let the
dignified pursuit of virtue and knowledge raise the mind above those
emotions which rather imbitter than sweeten the cup of life, when they are
not restrained within due bounds’ (1995:101).

However,

Wollstonecraft's

emphasis

on

the

controlling

power

of

rationalit y is hard to reconcile with several aspects of her own behaviour
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where emotion rather than reason dictated her conduct: her visit to Lisbon
in 1785 to assist her closest friend Fanny Blood in childbirth which led to
the closure of the school in Newington Green she had established in 1784;
the perilous journey to revolutionary Paris alone in December 1792
following her rejection by Fuseli; and her continuing trust in Imlay over
the period 1794 to 1795 notwithstanding the evidence of his growing
detachment, both physical and emotional. An explanation for this
divergence may be found in Wollstonecraft’s views on the relationship
between

rationalit y

and

emotionalism.

Wollstonecraft

argued

that

women’s excessive emotionalism, or ‘overweening sensibilit y’ (1995:94),
had developed as a consequence of defective education aimed onl y at
achieving ‘trivial accomplishments’: ‘All their thoughts turn on things
calculated to excite emotion; and feeling, when they should reason, their
conduct is unstable, and their opinions are wavering - not the wavering
produced by deliberation or progressive views, but by contradictory
emotions’ (1995:136). If, however, women, freed from ‘the t yranny of
man’, had the opportunit y to develop their faculties of reason through a
proper

s ystem

of

education

and

were

able

to

secure

financial

independence and civil status independentl y of marriage, they would be
able to acquire virtues b y their own exertions and the exercise of reason
(1995:125).

The occasions on which Wollstonecraft failed to exercise her own
‘faculties of reason’ can therefore be seen as confirming her own inabilit y
to escape from the dependency and social constraints she had identified in
A Vindication. As Ferguson and Todd commented on Wollstonecraft’s
relationship with Fuseli, a married man, at the time she was writing A
Vindication: ‘Ironicall y, however, its ringing lines were composed when
she herself was the victim of the excessive sensibilit y she condemned, a
prey to an infatuation encouraged by her female education but forbidden
b y societ y’ (1984:59). It was onl y in the final year of her life, when
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Wollstonecraft enjoyed a relationship with William Godwin based on
mutual respect and affection, that she finall y attained the balance between
rationalit y and emotional fulfillment she had sketched in A Vindication:
‘Besides, the woman who strengthens her bod y and exercises her mind
will, b y managing her famil y and practicing various virtues, become the
friend, and not the humble dependent of her husband’ (1995:99).

3. Virtue
‘For man and woman, truth, if I understand the meaning of the word, must
be the same; yet the fanciful female character, so prettil y drawn by poets
and novelists, demanding the sacrifice of truth and sincerit y, virtue
becomes a relative idea, having no other foundation than utilit y, and of
that utilit y men pretend arbitraril y to judge, shaping it to their own
convenience’ (1995:124). Wollstonecraft opposed this relative conception,
developed most notabl y by Rousseau in Emile (1762) who considered that
‘women should order their conduct not to align it with absolute ethical
standards but to please men’ (Ferguson and Todd, 1984:67), and argued in
A Vindication for a shared conception of virtue based on reason rather
than utilit y: ‘every being may become virtuous by the exercise of its own
reason’ (1995:89). Consequentl y, Wollstonecraft emplo yed virtue in the
modern as opposed to ancient, ‘austerel y civic’ sense, following the
terminology elaborated by Pocock (1985:48), in that she accepted that it
was to be located in the social rather than the political sphere. While
women's exclusion from public life led Wollstonecraft to adopt this usage
in A Vindication, she did not accept such exclusion was justified: ‘women
ought to have representatives, instead of being arbitrarily governed
without having any direct share allowed them in the deliberations of
government’ (1995:237).

In A Vindication Wollstonecraft explores how a common standard of
virtue could be achieved by deconstructing a number of individual virtues
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and anal ysing how far each one is irredeemabl y compromised or capable
of a positive reinterpretation. In particular, she castigates gallantry and
‘polished manners’ (1985:84) for men and ‘gentleness, docilit y and
spaniel-like affection’ for women (1985:103) as false, superficial virtues
submitting women to dependency on men and depriving them of libert y,
‘the mother of virtue’ (1995:107). The positive virtues are those that
encourage independence and mutual respect and affection between men
and women: ‘Chastity, modest y, public spirit, and all the noble train of
virtues, on which social virtue and happiness are built, should be
understood and cultivated by all mankind, or they will be cultivated to
little effect’ (1995:229).

However, Wollstonecraft’s emphasis on chastit y as the foundation of
modest y in both sexes, which derived from her emphasis on spiritual
values and led her to argue for a platonic basis to sexual relationship
within marriage (1985:100), conflicted with her view that sexualit y and
moralit y should be kept separate: ‘Women as well as men ought to have
the common appetites and passions of their nature, they are onl y brutal
when unchecked by reason: but the obligation to check them is the dut y of
mankind, not a sexual dut y. Nature, in these respects may safely be left to
herself; let women onl y acquire knowledge and humanit y, and love will
teach

them

modesty’

Wollstonecraft's

(1995:217).

relationship

This

with

Fuseli

conflict
where,

was
as

illustrated
Godwin

in

wryl y

commented: ‘She had, at first, considered it as reasonable and judicious,
to cultivate what I may be permitted to call, a Platonic affection for him;
but she did not, in the sequel find all the satisfaction in this plan, which
she had originall y expected from it’ (1969:64-65).

However, it was during Wollstonecraft's relationship with the American
writer and businessman Gilbert Imlay from 1793 to 1796, which is
recorded in Letters to Imlay and Memoirs of Mary Wollstonecraft, both
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published by her husband William Godwin in 1798, that the principles sh e
had established for virtuous conduct in A Vindication were most severel y
tested. Many aspects of Wollstonecraft’s conduct in the relationship, in
particular her two suicide attempts in 1795 while her daughter was barel y
a year old, cannot be reconciled with her admonition to women in A
Vindication: ‘Their first dut y is to themselves as rational creatures, and
the next, in point of importance, as citizens, is that, which includes so
man y, of a mother’ (1995:235). However, many of Wollstonecraft’s
actions during this period, did display the ‘truth and fortitude, the
cornerstones of all human virtue’ (1985:94) she had advocated in A
Vindication: her continued residence in France after war with England
broke out in February 1793 during which she wrote her account of the
origins and earl y stages of the Revolution, An Historical and Moral View
of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution; her arduous voyage
to Scandinavia in 1795, accompanied only b y her daughter and maid, on
the business affairs of Imlay and described in Letters Written During a
Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark (1796); and the
emotional frankness with which she recorded her relationship with Imlay
and their infant daughter Fann y in Letters to Imlay (1798).

4. Knowledge
In A Vindication Wollstonecraft advocates the pursuit of knowledge as the
key to women achieving independence and virtue: ‘Would ye. O m y
sisters, reall y possess modest y, ye must remember that the possession of
virtue, of any denomination, is incompatible with ignorance and vanit y!
Ye must acquire that soberness of mind, which the excesses of duties, and
the pursuit of knowledge, alone inspire, or you will remain in a doubtful
dependent situation, and onl y be loved while you are fair!’ (1995:218). As
Tomaselli

pointed

out

(1995:313),

Wollstonecraft's

views

on

the

importance of the acquisition of knowledge were heavil y influenced b y
John Locke's empiricist theories on the association of ideas in Essay
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Concerning

Human

Understanding

(1690)

and

their

application

to

educational practices in Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693).
However, they were also founded on her belief in the immortalit y of the
soul since, without such a belief, the purpose of life would be limited to
maximising earthl y happiness: ‘knowledge beyond the conveniences of
life would be a curse’ and ‘the passions also, the winds of life, would be
useless, if not injurious’ since the ‘appetites would answer every earthl y
purpose’ (1995:192). Instead, Wollstonecraft argued the urge to improve
‘the faculties of each individual’ was implanted b y God: ‘But the powers
of the soul that are of little use here, and, probabl y, disturb our animal
enjo yments, even while conscious dignity makes us glory in possessing
them, prove that life is merel y an education, a state of infancy, to which
the onl y hopes worth cherishing should not be sacrificed’ (1995:192).

Wollstonecraft, consistentl y with her belief in the progressive nature of
the development of human understanding, was careful in A Vindication to
advocate the acquisition of knowledge by the exercise of a person’s own
faculties rather than instruction based upon ‘blind obedience’ and
premature ‘regulation of the passions’; for passions when subjected to the
‘exercise of their own reason’ are a principal cause of attaining ‘great
virtues’ (1995:190-193). Knowledge moreover was not something to be
easil y acquired, and hardship was not in her eyes wasted: ‘I very much
doubt whether an y knowledge can be attained without labour and sorrow;
and those who wish to spare their children both, should not complain, if
they are neither wise nor virtuous’ (1995: 196).

While this endorsement of the value of hardship and endurance and
hostilit y to ivory tower education echoes the stoic values defended b y
Rousseau (Hampsher-Monk 1992:158-159), an elitist theory of education
such as he had supported in A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750)
was rejected by Wollstonecraft in A Vindication: ‘It is not for the benefit
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of societ y that a few brilliant men should be brought forward at the
expense of the multitude’(1995:256). Instead, Wollstonecroft advocated a
national s ystem of mixed-sex elementary day schools until the age of nine
followed by specialised schooling as the means to break down social and
sexual divisions instilled by single sex and private schools: ‘These would
be schools of morality - and the happiness of man, allowed to flow from
the pure springs of dut y and affection, what advances might not the human
mind make? Societ y can onl y be happ y and free in proportion as it is
virtuous; but the present distinctions, established in societ y, corrode all
private, and blast all public virtue.’ (1995:269).

Wollstonecraft’s conviction that the acquisition of knowledge was the ke y
to improving women's character and opportunities directed her earl y
career and writings: in 1784 she established with her friend Fanny Blood
and sister Eliza a day school in Newington Green; in 1786 she wrote
Thoughts on the Education of Daughters and acted as governess to the
daughters of Viscount Kingsborough, where her radical methods of
education led to her dismissal in 1787; and in 1787 she wrote Original
Stories from Real Life, a series of moralit y tales for children. However,
the failure of these attempts to put into practice her educational ideas led
her to reassess what could be achieved within the existing social
constraints: ‘By the time she wrote The Rights of Woman, she no longer
treated as ends in themselves the acquisition of virtue and knowledge
through the exercise of reason and the regulation of passion. She had
become persuaded that reason alone could not ameliorate social and
political evils, for people like the powerful judge in The Wrongs of
Woman will act reasonabl y onl y in self-interest' (Ferguson and Todd,
1984:127).

9

5. Conclusions
Wollstonecraft’s experiences after completing A Vindication, when she
suffered rejection b y Fuseli and the disintegration of her relationship with
Imlay, showed her that the rational pursuit of virtue and knowledge she
had advocated in A Vindication was insufficient to bring personal
fulfillment. As she wrote to Imlay in November 1795, following her
second suicide attempt: ‘It seems to me, that m y conduct has always been
governed by the strictest principles of justice and truth. Yet, how
wretched have m y social feelings and delicacy of sentiment rendered me!
I have loved with my whole soul, onl y to discover that I had no chance of
a return - and that existence is a burden without it.’ (1989:435).

If Wollstonecraft had survived her second childbirth in 1797 she may
well, encouraged by the intellectual companionship of her husband
William Godwin, author of Enquiry concerning Political Justice (1793),
have continued to develop the principles set out in A Vindication to take
account of her subsequent experiences. Her unfinished novel The Wrongs
of Woman: or, Maria, A Fragment, published posthumously in 1798,
showed she was undertaking just such an examination of the relationship
of individual consciousness ‘in its contact with the world’ (Ferguson and
Todd, 1984:105) at the time of her death. The dialectical relationship
between Wollstonecraft’s experiences and the development of her ideas,
suggest however that a rigid attempt to reconcile her conduct with the
principles in A Vindication would be to misunderstand the progressive
nature of her thought.
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